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Abstract 
We analyze the incumbency effect on a candidate’s electoral prospects using a large data set on Italian 
municipal elections held from 1993 to 2011. We apply a non-parametric Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design 
that compares candidates who barely win an election to those who barely lose, exploiting the fact that 
incumbency status changes discontinuously at the threshold of margin of victory of zero. We find that 
incumbents are more likely to win the competition compared to their challengers at the Italian municipal 
elections. The results are robust to different specifications and estimation strategies with excellent balance in 
observable characteristics. Also, the effect of interest seems to be larger in magnitude for municipalities located 
in the North of Italy compared to southern municipalities. 
 
JEL Classification: D72, D78; J45 
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1. Introduction 
A growing body of literature emphasizes the crucial role played by political institutions in the process 
of economic development and in particular, how the distribution of political power
2
 improves 
economic performance and determines the allocation of resources, even in a democracy (Acemoglu, 
2002). According to the fiscal common theory (Tullock, 1959; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), 
politicians once elected, in order to obtain a greater electoral support, try to use their influence to 
redirect resources to particular groups of constituents to the detriment of the general community. The 
fact that holding political power makes such a difference is the reason that democratic governments 
are founded on the principle that voters should ultimately decide which representatives are chosen to 
wield power
3
 (Pande, 2003). 
                                                          
1
 I would like to thank Walter Beckert and Maria De Paola for useful comments. 
2 The political power is defined as an authority held by a group within a society that allows for the administration of public 
resources and implements policies for the society. Distribution of power is in balance when each decision is made by the 
group of individuals (politicians and citizens) affected by the consequences of the decision per se. Acemoglu (2002) shows 
that inefficient institutions and policies are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups that hold 
political power at the expense of the rest. Related to this argument, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b, 2002) explain why 
rulers who fear replacement may pursue the wrong policies for the society. In that paper, rulers who fear replacement are 
more likely to resist the introduction of superior technologies or institutions when these changes may erode their incumbency 
advantage and their potential future political power. 
3
 Further, since long tenure in public office leads to abuse of power, legislators in many democracies are subject to a term 
limit. 
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The major risk in a democracy is that elected officials will become entrenched or that running for 
office may simply become too expensive for fresh-candidates. By the nature of the democratic 
system, being incumbent is intrinsically advantageous since he/she is given access to resources and 
decision processes that non-incumbent challengers do not have. If elected officials are able to use 
their political influence to remain in power, voters will have a limited influence on their policy 
decisions (Linden, 2004), especially where incentives to engage in rent extraction usually run high 
(Titiunik, 2011). Moreover, stronger incumbents also raise the cost of entering politics and reduce the 
degree of political competition because new challengers might not have enough resources to 
overcome the advantage of incumbency and as a consequence, voters might be less inclined to 
participate at the polls.  
 For this reason, a large literature has investigated the effect of the incumbency status on the 
probability that an incumbent candidate wins the electoral competition both at the state (Garand, 
1991; King, 1990; Cox and Morgenstern, 1993) and federal level (Erikson, 1971; Alford and Hibbing, 
1981; Alford and Brady, 1988; Gelman and King, 1990) in U.S. House elections. Results generally 
show a personal incumbency advantage, defined as the votes gained by a candidate once he/she 
becomes an incumbent from constituency service, name recognition, and the like, in terms of winning 
the electoral competition. 
Moreover, some authors have focused on the incumbency effect at national and state elections in 
developing democracies, since the likelihood to observe both entrenched politicians controlling the 
political process as well as rampant corruption is higher (Linden, 2004). However, the evidence from 
some developing countries, such as India (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 2009), Latin America and Caribbean 
countries (Molina, 2001)
4
, suggests that there is a disadvantage to incumbents. The only exception is 
Miguel and Zaidi’s (2003) investigation of national elections in Ghana in which they find no 
significant incumbency effect at the parliamentary seat level
5
. 
Furthermore, related to this argument, a second strand of literature, following Lee (2008)’s work, 
has concentrated on the partisan incumbency effect, i.e. the electoral benefit a candidate receives 
purely because his/her party is the incumbent party, regardless of whether he/she previously served 
(Fowler and Hall, 2012), highlighting again mixed results. In fact, Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and 
Hainmueller and Kern (2008) find that the partisan incumbency status positively affects the 
probability of re-election and the likelihood of winning the competition in the US and in German 
districts at federal elections respectively. Conversely, Titiunik (2011), by using the same methodology 
                                                          
4 Molina (2001) argues that incumbent turnover is much higher in Latin American and Caribbean countries than many 
industrialized countries owing to endemic popular discontent over persistent deprivation. Conversely, for Indian national 
elections the incumbency disadvantage, especially after 1991, is essentially due to a change in the political structure that 
leads to a system in which as politicians gained more experience and influence they become more likely to pursue activities 
that are not in the best interest of voters (Linden, 2004). 
5 Miguel and Zaidi (2003) justify their results saying that the lack of a meaningful incumbency advantage is consistent with 
a political system where the ruling party does not have adequate mechanisms at its disposal to accurately target funds down 
to the level of parliamentary seats. However, they acknowledge some important limitations of their data set, including the 
small sample size which leads to statistically imprecise estimates. 
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as Lee (2008), analyses the incumbency effect for three different political parties at Brazilian 
municipal elections held in 2000 and finds a negative effect of the partisan incumbency both on the 
incumbent parties’ votes share as well as on their probability of winning the competition. 
In this paper we provide new evidence of the incumbency effect on a candidate’s electoral 
prospects, using a large data set on Italian municipal elections held from 1993 to 2011. Although 
many papers have focused on state and federal elections, maybe because politicians and voters attach 
a greater degree of importance and weight to national than to local elections arguing that local 
elections rarely make much difference in political life (Koryakov and Sisk, 2003) we study the 
personal incumbency advantage at municipal elections since they have certain distinct characteristics 
as compared with national elections which give them considerable significance in political life. First, 
local elections are important for their role in a broader national democracy, since their results are 
indicative of broader political trends and provide important information about the preferences, 
concerns and attitudes of the electorate. Second, issues in local elections are those that directly affect 
the daily lives of citizens: the nature of the competition between candidates and the issues that arise 
can be important indicators of what voters care deeply about and want the local authorities to tackle.  
As far as the methodology implemented to recover the causal incumbency effect is concerned, the 
main difficulty in empirically estimating incumbency advantage/disadvantage is omitted variable bias, 
since some candidate’s characteristics such as charisma, charm and intelligence are typically 
unobservable and unquantifiable (Levitt, 1994). If higher quality candidates attract more votes, 
electoral selection will lead to incumbents and challengers possessing different characteristics. Failure 
to control for these differences may lead to biased estimates of incumbency advantage (Gelman and 
King, 1990). In order to overcome the problem of selection bias and omitted variable bias, we 
implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD). We focus on very close elections which are 
decided by a narrow margin of victory. The bare winners and bare losers of these elections are 
assumed to be comparable in all their baseline characteristics (we discuss this assumption in Sub-
Section 3.1). This implies that bare losers provide a valid counterfactual for bare winners with regard 
to subsequent electoral outcomes. By comparing these outcomes we identify the causal effect of the 
incumbency status. 
We believe that the contribution of our paper is twofold. Firstly, the literature investigating the 
incumbency advantage/disadvantage for European countries is scant, and in particular, no author so 
far has analysed whether incumbent mayors have or do not have an advantage in winning the 
competition compared to non-incumbent candidates for Italian municipal elections. In fact, decisions 
made at municipal level in Italy have a great impact on citizens’ daily lives, since these decisions 
often concern relevant services, such as the management of public utilities, the provision of public 
housing etc. For this reason, citizens are usually interested in the composition of the Municipal bodies 
and in the performance of the mayor, especially when he/she has already performed the same charge 
in the past. In particular, our Sharp Regression Discontinuity estimates show that the personal 
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incumbency effect, after controlling both for candidates and municipalities’ characteristics as well as 
for partisan swing and partisan incumbency, is about 34.3 percentage points, implying that 
incumbents (bare winners) are more likely to win the competition compared to their challengers (bare 
losers). Similar results are found when we use as dependent variable the vote share at time t (the 
personal incumbency effect is roughly 17 percentage points)
6
, after controlling for municipalities and 
candidates’ characteristics. Moreover, our findings are in line with those found in the literature (see 
for instance Alford and Brady, 1988; Gelman and King, 1990), although the methodology used in the 
previous papers does not take into account potential omitted variable bias. However, the effect we 
find is larger in terms of magnitude, maybe because we focus our analysis on local elections where 
the incumbency status explains most of the variation in the probability of winning the electoral 
competition compared to federal or national elections. To the best of our knowledge, the only authors 
using the Regression Discontinuity Design to find the causal effect of the personal incumbency status 
on the probability of winning the electoral competition are Uppal (2009) who finds an incumbency 
disadvantage of 22 percentage points over the probability of winning at time t after 1991 at Indian 
state elections, and Trounstine (2011) who highlights an incumbency advantage of 32 percentage 
points at city council elections between 1915 and 1985 in four U.S. cities.
7
 
Secondly, we study the personal incumbency effect by taking into account the differences in the 
economic and social conditions of the two main geographical areas (South and North) in Italy. On the 
one hand, as the southern part of the country is poorer and endowed with a low level of social capital, 
the positive impact of the incumbency status on both the votes share as well as on the probability of 
winning the election may be related to the clientelistic relationships established by the incumbent 
candidates, which ensure political support in exchange of benefits (exchange votes). Areas endowed 
with low social capital are characterized by relationships that often involve requests for jobs and 
patronage, and citizens living in these areas may be more inclined to cast their vote in relation to 
exchange agreements (Knack, 2002). On the other hand, in areas characterized by general discontent 
as the South of Italy, incumbents may have some difficulties in satisfying the majority of voters and 
as a consequence, the probability of winning the electoral competition for incumbent candidates is 
expected to be lower than that of incumbents holding power in the North. Our findings are in line with 
this second explanation since bare winners are 42.5 percentage points more likely to win the 
competition compared to bare losers in the North, whereas for southern municipalities we find an 
incumbent advantage of 26.7 percentage points. 
Finally, our results are robust to different specifications of our main equation. In particular, our 
findings are similar when we consider only observations in narrow neighborhoods around the 
discontinuity point (5 and 2 percent above and below the threshold of margin of victory of zero 
                                                          
6
 Results not displayed, but available upon request. 
7
 As recognised by the author, these four cities (Austin, Dallas, San Antonio and San Jose) are not a representative sample of 
U.S. cities. Therefore, the conclusion of this paper may be limited by the sample used. Moreover, she does not have enough 
observations to separately analyze mayoral elections. 
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respectively), and when we choose different polynomials of the forcing variable (Local Linear 
Regression) along with the interaction terms between polynomials of the electoral margin (until the 
third-order) and the treatment. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the methodology implemented. In 
Section 3 we describe the institutional framework, our data set and we check the validity of the RDD. 
In Section 4, we discuss our main results estimates, whereas in Section 5 we present some robustness 
checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Previous Measures of Incumbency Advantage and Methodology 
 
2.1 How to Measure the Personal Incumbency Advantage 
 
Erikson (1971) is the first author who studies the incumbency advantage systematically. He compares 
the vote share of an individual politician running for the second time with the politician’s vote share 
in the first successful election, by taking into account reciprocal causation, the partisan swing and 
other factors affecting the incumbency status. However, he uses a “regression on residuals” procedure 
that is quite biased in general (see King, 1986).  
 An alternative measure is proposed by Garand and Gross (1984) who use the difference in the vote 
margin between incumbent winners and non-incumbent winners. Nevertheless, as suggested by 
Jacobson (1987) and Alford and Brady (1988), the estimates are seriously affected by selection bias 
because of the complete exclusion of incumbent losers. In fact, they overestimate the incumbency 
advantage since their measure attributes party strength in a district to the incumbency (Gelman and 
King, 1990).  
A second strand of literature uses the “sophomore surge” and “retirement slump” to estimate the 
incumbency effect. The sophomore surge is the average vote gain enjoyed by freshman candidates 
running as incumbents for the first time and the retirement slump is the average falloff in the party’s 
vote when the incumbent retires (Cover and Mayhew, 1977). In addition, Alford and Brady (1988) 
introduce a measure of the incumbency advantage, called “slurge” that is the average between the 
sophomore surge and the retirement slump. The intuition behind this measure is that, since sophomore 
surge underestimates - retirement slump overestimates - the incumbency effect, the average of the two 
might be a better estimate than the two measures alone. However, the two effects cancel out only if 
the true incumbency advantage is zero, and it has been shown (Gelman and King, 1990) that “slurge” 
generally underestimates the incumbency advantage. 
 Finally, several variants of sophomore surge and retirement slump also exist. For instance, Payne 
(1981), calculating scores separately for the Democrats and Republicans and then averaging them, 
finds biased estimates if the incumbency advantage is the same for both parties. Alford and Hibbing 
(1981) compute sophomore surge and retirement slump for the second and third reelections instead of 
the first only, to provide useful information about electoral career paths. Nevertheless, this procedure 
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is still biased for the same reasons as the standard sophomore surge and retirement slump measures 
are biased (Gelman and King, 1990). 
 All the previous research is plagued by problems of the identification of the incumbency causal 
effect. The main issue is that the incumbency effect, based on the differential outcomes of incumbents 
and non-incumbents, suffers from a selection bias problem, since only those candidates who are better 
in quality may win and become incumbents. As a result, incumbency status of a candidate is not 
randomly assigned and in turn, the effect that previous authors have attributed to incumbency might 
include the effect of intrinsic differences in candidate characteristics (Uppal, 2009). 
 In order to handle this kind of selection bias issue, we follow Uppal (2009) using a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD henceforth) that approximates a natural experiment and, under certain 
continuity conditions
8
, achieves a random assignment of incumbency status (Lee, 2008). The 
peculiarity of the RDD comes from the fact that the treatment assignment mechanism is known (since 
the incumbency status is a deterministic function of the margin of victory at time t-1). Under weak 
smoothness assumptions (see Rubin, 1974; Hahn et al., 2000 for a rigorous discussion), the RDD 
allows us to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) at the discontinuity of the covariate (margin 
of victory) that determines treatment assignment. Even under non-random selection into treatment, the 
RD design yields an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. This is the case because the margin of 
victory is a function of observed vote shares. Observed vote shares in turn consist of a latent 
systematic component that incumbents can influence, but also a random component over which 
incumbents cannot exert control (Hainmueller and Kern, 2008). It can be proven that as long as the 
covariate that determines assignment to treatment includes such a random component with a 
continuous density, treatment status is randomized at the threshold (Lee, 2008). Therefore, at the 
threshold, all observed and unobserved covariates will be independent of treatment assignment.  
It is important at least to briefly consider the conditions under which the assumption of local 
random assignment at the threshold could be wrong. Local random assignment critically hinges on the 
presence of the random component. This does not imply that each municipal race has to be decided by 
this random component; in most races the random component will not be decisive. The key idea is 
that as races become closer and closer, confounders cease to systematically affect treatment 
assignment. In the limit, i.e. at the threshold, treatment assignment should be independent of all 
confounding variables. The plausibility of this assumption is a function of the degree to which 
candidates are able to sort around the threshold. For example, if candidates had perfect control over 
their observed vote shares or were able to perfectly predict them, they would never run if they knew 
that they would lose. Alternatively, they would just invest enough effort to get exactly one more vote 
than the strongest district opponent. Such behavior would violate our identifying assumption. 
                                                          
8 As shown by Lee and Lemieux (2009), only if all observable and unobservable covariates, except treatment, are distributed 
continuously around the threshold, we can assume to have valid counterfactual observations on either side. If observations 
just right from the required cutoff are systematically different from the ones just to the left, then identification fails. 
7 
 
However, given the randomness inherent in elections, such a scenario seems rather implausible 
(Matsusaka and Palda, 1999).  
Finally, just as in a randomized experiment, treatment effects will not be confounded by omitted 
variables. This provides an important advantage over commonly used regression models which are by 
construction vulnerable to omitted variable bias. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
The ideal natural experiment for estimating the incumbency effect would require to observe both a 
candidate as an incumbent and a non-incumbent at the same point of time which, obviously, is not 
possible (Uppal, 2009). The minimum requirement to estimate the casual effect of the incumbency 
status on the probability of winning the electoral competition would be to have candidates randomly 
assigned as incumbents and non-incumbents. This is not likely to be true because incumbents usually 
win the competition thanks to some intrinsic characteristics that are not possessed by non-incumbents. 
The main identification strategy in the RDD is that incumbency status changes discontinuously at 
the threshold of margin of victory of zero. Candidates who have a positive margin of victory become 
incumbents and those who have a negative margin of victory become non-incumbents. In particular, 
the RDD compares barely winners, i.e. candidates who are just above this threshold with barely 
losers, i.e. candidates just below the threshold. The intuition is that such candidates are, on average, 
similar in all observable and unobservable characteristics, and differ only in their incumbency status, 
implying that the assignment of incumbency status is approximately random in the neighborhood of a 
margin of victory of zero
9
.  
In particular, the baseline model we want to estimate is as follows:  
 
[1]      (      )                                   
 
where        is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if candidate i wins the election at time t and 
zero otherwise;                        is an indicator variable for the incumbency status of a 
candidate such that                        equals one if the margin of victory at time t-1 is larger than 
zero and zero if it is negative;      is the stochastic error term. In the ideal case when the assignment of 
incumbency status is random, β is the difference in the probability of winning between incumbents 
and non-incumbents, or the true incumbency effect: 
[2]   [      |                         ]   [      |                         ]   .  
 
However, the assignment of incumbency status is likely to be non-random because incumbents and 
non-incumbents may have some idiosyncratic differences, such as charisma, charm, intelligence, party 
organization or campaign resources. In this case, equation [2] includes a bias due to differences in 
candidates’ intrinsic characteristics, i.e.         :  
                                                          
9 Further, some chance factors, such as the weather conditions on the election day, that might affect the outcome of the 
election do not vary systematically between incumbents and non-incumbents. 
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[3]   [      |                         ]   [      |                         ]             
 
Equations (3) can alternatively be written as follows: 
 
[4]   [      |                      ]   [      |                      ]             
 
where                      is the margin of victory of candidate i at time t-1. The RDD compares 
candidates at election t-1 who are marginally above the threshold of  margin of victory of zero with 
those who are marginally below the threshold: 
[5]    [      |                        ]   [      |                         ]        
 
   , 
 
[6]            [    |                        ]   [                             ]  
 
where   represents the closeness of the elections. As   becomes smaller,          goes to zero and   
measures the casual incumbency effect: 
[7]           [      |                        ]           [      |                         ]     
 
The validity of the RDD about a random assignment of the incumbency status depends on the 
assumption that candidates around the threshold are similar. This implies that the identification 
strategy is valid, and that only incumbency status changes discontinuously as a function of the margin 
of victory and all other characteristics vary smoothly
10
. The only assumption made here is that 
unobservable characteristics are continuous functions of the margin of victory at time t-1, which is a 
much weaker restriction on the stochastic error term and implies that g(    |                     ), the 
conditional density function of     , is continuous. The continuity of observable characteristics will be 
checked in the next section. 
 
3. Institutional Framework and Data 
The system currently regulating municipal elections in Italy has been introduced in 1993 (DL 25 
March 1993, no. 81). It has established the direct election of the mayor and the adoption of the 
plurality rule, with some differences according to the size of the city. For municipalities with a 
population of fewer than 15,000 inhabitants, elections are held with single ballot and plurality rule: 
the winning candidate is awarded a majority premium of at least two-thirds of the seats in the council. 
For cities with a population above 15,000, elections are held using a dual ballot system (where the 
second ballot is held only if none of the candidates obtains an absolute majority of votes in the first 
ballot). Only the two leading candidates at the first round compete in the second ballot and the 
winning candidate is awarded a majority premium of at least 60 percent of the seats in the council. 
                                                          
10 The only assumption made is that unobservable characteristics are continuous functions of the forcing variable, i.e. the 
margin of victory. 
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Since 1993, mayors have been subject to a two-term limit, while members of the Executive 
Committee and of the Municipal Council, endowed with legislative power, can be re-elected 
indefinitely. 
Municipal elections in Italy are held every 5 years
11
 and Municipal governments cannot choose the 
election schedule. In certain circumstances, the legislature may not survive until the end of its 
legislative term, e.g. because of a mayor’s early resignation. In these cases, elections are held before 
the natural schedule, and, as a consequence, all subsequent elections will be held at different times 
from other municipalities that have completed the foreseen legislative term.  
Municipalities have a registry of eligible voters, which is revised whenever there is an election and 
all citizens aged 18 or above on the election date are automatically registered to vote. Voting takes 
place in polling stations organized by the local authorities. Elections are organized according to a 
traditional paper ballot system.  
Our empirical analysis is based on a panel data set, provided by the Italian Ministry of the Internal 
Affairs. In order to focus on elections regulated by the same rules, we only consider municipalities 
with less than 15,000 inhabitants, in which elections are held with single ballot and plurality rule.
12
 
Moreover, we drop elections in which Personal Incumbency is zero for both candidates. This might be 
the case either when bare losers and bare winners are freshman candidates at time t (open seats) or 
when the election is characterized by a binding term limit for the mayor
13
. We end up with a sample 
composed by 9,948 candidate-level observations (we have a bare winner and a bare loser from each 
election) for 4,246 Italian municipalities over the period 1993-2011.  
For each municipal election we have information on the number of candidates who run for a mayor 
position at each election, on their gender, age, educational attainment, previous job, vote shares and 
party affiliation (Anagrafe degli Amministratori Locali, Ministero dell’Interno).14 Using this 
information, we build our dependent variable Win that equals 1 if the candidate i wins the election at 
time t and zero otherwise, Personal Incumbency taking the value of 1 when among the first two best 
candidates running for election at time t there is the exiting mayor and zero otherwise. In other words, 
Personal Incumbency is equal to one if the margin of victory at time t-1 is positive and zero 
otherwise. We define the margin of victory of a candidate in multicandidate races as follows: the 
winner’s margin of victory is the difference between his or her vote share and the vote share of the 
second-place candidate (divided by the number of valid ballots). Similarly, the margin of victory of a 
loser is the difference between his or her vote share and the vote share of the winner. This construct 
                                                          
11
 With the exception of the years between 1993 and 1999, when the electoral mandate had a duration of 4 years. 
12
 The results reported in this paper remain substantially unchanged if we include in our sample also municipalities voting 
under the dual ballot system (those with more than 15,000 inhabitants). Results are available upon request. 
13
 According to the Italian law not all the incumbent mayors can run for election. Because of a term limit, mayors cannot 
spend more than two consecutive terms in office. Then, we define Binding Term Limit as a dummy variable equal to one if 
the term limit constraint is binding and equal to zero if the term limit is slack. In our analysis, since we are focusing on 
elections in which the mayor reruns in election t, the term limit is always slack. 
 
14
 It is possible to obtain detailed data at an individual level at the following website: http://amministratori.interno.it  
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allows the margin of victory to be positive for winning candidates and negative for losing candidates 
(on average it is equal to 0.0164). Moreover, we build a dummy Partisan Swing which is equal to 1 if 
candidates running for a mayor position do not belong to a national political party (Lista Civica) and 
zero otherwise, and Partisan Incumbency  which is equal to 1 if one of the parties competing at the 
electoral race at time t is an incumbent party and zero otherwise. From Table 1, we can notice that 
57.3% of candidates running for election at time t have already been mayor in the previous legislature, 
60% of candidates belong to a Lista Civica and 36.85% of parties competing at time t are incumbent.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
15
 
Win 0.5343 0.4988 0 1 9,948 
Personal Incumbency 0.5730 0.4957 0 1 9,948 
Partisan Incumbency 0.3685 0.4327 0 1 9,948 
Partisan Swing 0.6052 0.4888 0 1 9,948 
Electoral Margin (%) 0.0164 0.1265 -0.25 0.25 9,948 
Female Candidate 0.0898 0.2859 0 1 9,948 
Candidates’ Age 49.5627 9.8957 18 86 9,948 
Candidates’ Education 14.4102 3.4934 5 18 9,948 
No. Candidates 2.5176 0.8133 1 8 9,948 
Turnout 0.7801 0.0917 0.2162 0.9644 9,948 
Population Size/1,000 3.5545 3.2034 0.033 14.996 9,948 
Education of Population 7.0734 0.8374 4.3494 12.5668 9,948 
Employment 0.2421 0.1352 0.0262 0.8457 9,948 
Elderly People (>=65) 0.1987 0.0637 0.0434 0.5655 9,948 
Source: Local Administrators Data set (1985-2011), Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs; Italian Census of Population (1991 and 
2001). 
 
Using the information on candidates' gender we have built a dummy variable Female Candidate 
taking the value of 1 for female candidates running for a mayor position and zero otherwise. The 
proportion of women, among the first two candidates, participating at the electoral competition is 
about 9% with a standard deviation of 0.28. Moreover, the average educational attainment of 
candidates (Candidates’ Education) is quite high (14 years of education), highlighting how the 
majority of candidates has at least obtained a high-school diploma,
16
 whereas the average age of the 
two best candidates running for a mayor position (Candidates’ Age) is about 49. 
Furthermore, for each municipal election we have information on the number of voters and the 
number of people eligible to vote. We measure Turnout as the ratio between the number of voters and 
the number of eligible voters. As shown in Table 1, Italy is characterized by a quite high electoral 
turnout compared to many European countries and to US: the average turnout in the period 1993-2011 
has been of 78%, with a standard deviation of 0.0917. 
                                                          
15 The number of observations refers to the regression in which we add all our control variables, we restrict our analysis to 
elections held in municipalities with a population lower than 15,000 inhabitants by choosing a bandwidth of 25 percent 
above and below the threshold of margin of victory of zero. 
16
 In Italy, it takes 13 years to attain a High-School Degree while 17-18 years are necessary to attain a College Degree. 
Moreover, the educational attainment of people with a PhD or a Master degree is always 18 years in our sample. 
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Finally, we use the 1991 and 2001 Italian Census of Population to obtain time varying information 
at municipal level regarding population size, the number of employed individuals, the proportion of 
elderly people and the educational attainment of the population
17
. The average population size of 
Italian municipalities is 3,55. The population’s number of years of education is, on average, 7.07, the 
ratio between the number of employed individuals and the total number of inhabitants is 24.21% and 
the proportion of people aged 65 or above is on average 19.87%. 
 
3.1 Smoothness Conditions and Validity of the Sharp RDD 
In this sub-section we check the validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design as a local 
randomized experiment. The general concern with our identification strategy is that some 
characteristics other than incumbency status vary discontinuously with respect to the margin of 
victory.  
As shown by Lee and Lemieux (2010) if variation in the treatment near the threshold is 
approximately randomized, then it follows that all “baseline characteristics” – all those variables 
determined prior to the realization of the assignment variable – should have the same distribution just 
above and just below the cutoff. If there is a discontinuity in these baseline covariates, then at a 
minimum, the underlying identifying assumption of individuals’ inability to precisely manipulate the 
assignment variable is unwarranted. 
It is standard in the RD design to demonstrate that treatment and control groups are similar in their 
observed baseline covariates. It is similarly impossible to test whether unobserved characteristics are 
balanced in the experimental context, so the most favorable statement that can be made about the 
experiment is that the data “failed to reject” the assumption of randomization (Lee and Lemieux, 
2010). In other words, since information about unobserved characteristics of candidates and 
municipalities is not available, the focus is on observed characteristics, such as the educational 
attainment of candidates, the age of candidates running for a mayor position, the proportion of female 
candidates, the partisan swing, the voter turnout, the number of candidates competing for election, the 
population’s level of education, the employment rate and the proportion of people aged 65 or above.  
 To check whether the assumptions of the RD are satisfied, we present a test of the continuity of 
the distribution of the covariates at the cut-point. The idea behind this kind of test is to regress a 
covariate on a third or fourth order polynomial of the forcing variable interacted with dummies for the 
treatment status: a statistically insignificant coefficient for the treatment dummy is taken as evidence 
in favor of local random assignment (Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Lee, 2008; Lee, Moretti and Butler, 
2004). 
In Table 2 we test whether the incumbency status is predictive of a larger set of municipal and 
candidates’ characteristics, by choosing a bandwidth of 25, 5 and 2 percent above and below the 
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margin of victory threshold respectively, and by controlling for a third-order polynomial of the 
forcing variable interacted with our treatment variable Personal Incumbency
18
, and for municipal-time 
fixed effects. Moreover, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the 
municipal level.  
Overall, Table 6 shows that the incumbency status predicts some of the predetermined 
characteristics when we choose a bandwidth of 25 percent (column 1). However, the coefficient on 
our variable of interest becomes smaller and statistically insignificant (see columns 2 and 3) as we 
examine closer elections (the margin of victory gets closer to zero).
19
Over 9 covariates, only the 
coefficient on Candidates’ Age is statistically significant at 10 percent level. Since not all the 
predetermined characteristics are balanced we add them as control variables in the specifications of 
our model displayed in the next section. 
  
   Table 2: Incumbency Effect and Predetermined Characteristics 
Variables Coefficient on Incumbent 
Bandwidth ±25 % 
(1) 
Bandwidth ±5 % 
(2) 
Bandwidth ±2 % 
(3) 
Candidates’ Education 0.174  
(0.191) 
0.321  
(0.467) 
0.537  
(0.798) 
Candidates’ Age 2.429*** 
(0.513) 
2.881** 
(1.212) 
3.989*  
(2.165) 
Female Candidates -0.044 *** 
(0.016) 
-0.043  
(0.034) 
-0.078  
(0.051) 
Partisan Swing 0.021 
(0.023) 
-0.038 
(0.049) 
-0.097 
(0.069) 
No. Candidates 0.003  
(0.030) 
0.043  
(0.039) 
0.004  
(0.016) 
Turnout 0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
Population’s Education 0.007  
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.001  
(0.005) 
Employment -0.001  
(0.001) 
-0.001  
(0.002) 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
Elderly People -0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001  
(0.000) 
-0.001  
(0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable is specified in each row. The regression regresses the dependent variable on the incumbency status. In 
each regression we control for, annual and municipal fixed effects and for a cubic polynomial of the assignment variable. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets, clustered at municipal level. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
As a last specification test of our design, we plot, in Figure 1, the histogram of the margin of 
victory around the zero cutoff, with a bin of 50. If there were any discontinuities in the histogram at 
the cutoff point, one might be concerned that incumbent candidates are able to manipulate the margin 
of victory at time t-1, or in other words if individuals have a great deal of control over the assignment 
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third order. 
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 The same findings hold true when we implement a difference-in-means test for the predetermined characteristics 
mentioned above between bare winners and bare losers (results are available upon request). 
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variable and if there is a perceived benefit to a treatment, one would certainly expect individuals on 
one side of the threshold (incumbents) to be systematically different from those on the other side 
(challengers). However, as Figure 1 depicts, the histogram does not show any big jump around the 
threshold.  
 
 
Figure 1: Histogram of the Margin of Victory (t-1) 
 
These results are confirmed by Figure 2, in which a McCrary test is performed by running a kernel 
local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of the threshold (McCrary, 
2008), by considering observations in a bandwidth of 5 percent close to the zero margin of victory. As 
we can see from the figure, the log-difference between the frequency to the right and to the left of the 
threshold is not statistically significant at conventional levels (it is equal to 0.222 with a standard 
deviation of 0.138). 
 
 
Figure 2: McCrary test – Manipulation Assignment Variable 
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4 Sharp RDD Estimates: Main Results 
In this section, to understand whether an incumbent has a personal advantage compared to his/her 
challengers in terms of winning the electoral competition at time t, we implement a Sharp RDD and 
estimate a linear probability model with fixed effects at municipal level: 
 
[1]                                                                                  
               
where          is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the candidate i wins the electoral 
competition at time t in municipality j and zero otherwise;                        is our main 
variable of interest measuring the incumbency status of candidates at the electoral race running for the 
mayor position in the municipality j at time t;      is a vector including controls for municipal 
characteristics at the time of elections (population size, voter turnout, the average number of years of 
education of the inhabitants, the number of employed people over the number of inhabitants and the 
fraction of employed people in the population) and electoral competition’s characteristics (i.e. the 
number of candidates at the electoral race);      is a vector including controls for candidates’ 
characteristics (the age of candidates, a dummy variable                     taking the value of 1 
for female candidates and zero otherwise, the educational attainment of candidates at the electoral 
race, candidates’ party affiliation and a dummy variable                        that measures the 
incumbency status of candidates’ parties at the electoral race)            are respectively a municipal 
and a year fixed effect. The municipal fixed effects    accounts for time-invariant municipal 
characteristics, whereas    is used to take into account any differences across time.        is the 
stochastic component in our model. 
 Moreover, f(.) is a polynomial function for the forcing variable, i.e. the degree of electoral 
competition at time t-1, as measured by the difference in votes (%) between the winner and his/her 
closest challenger. As stated by Lee and Lemieux (2010), trying more flexible specification of our 
model by adding polynomials in the forcing variable as regressors is an important and useful way of 
assessing the robustness of the RD estimates of the treatment effect. 
In all regressions standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the municipal 
level to take into account the fact that candidates’ behavior in the same municipality may be affected 
by common shocks. Further, in all the specifications we control for a third order polynomial of the 
electoral margin at time t-1
20
, we choose a bandwidth of 25 percent above and below the threshold of 
margin of victory of zero and we focus on elections held with single ballot and plurality rule only. 
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Furthermore, in our analysis we focus on elections where there is an incumbent among candidates 
competing for a mayoral position. This might lead to a selection bias in our estimates since the 
rerunning decisions might differ systematically between incumbents and challengers, especially at 
local races. Some authors (see Uppal, 2009; Trounstine, 2011) have conditioned their incumbency 
estimates on candidates who rerun in election t. Also this solution could give rise to a sample 
selection bias issue in the estimated incumbency effect if bare losers who rerun are systematically 
different from losers who do not rerun. Unfortunately, we cannot condition our estimates on 
candidates who rerun in election t since at Italian municipal elections challengers are always different 
from election at time t-1 to next election. Moreover, conditional incumbency advantage/disadvantage 
has been strongly criticized by De Magalhaes (2014) because if           ) ≠ 0
21
, then conditioning 
the RDD sample on rerunning implies that the control and treatment groups are no longer likely to be 
balanced and in turn, RDD is not valid to estimate the causal effect of incumbency conditional on 
rerunning. All in all our empirical findings must be interpreted with reference to the selected sub-
population which data were sampled, i.e. elections where an incumbent decides to run.  
Table 3 presents the main results. In column (1) in which we control for year and 
municipal fixed effects as only, we find that the incumbent has an advantage in winning the 
electoral competition at time t: the personal incumbency effect is about 36.2 percentage 
points, implying that incumbents (bare winners) are more likely to win the competition 
compared to their challengers (bare losers). 
In column (2) we add some candidates’ characteristics as control variables. Again we find a 
positive and statistically significant incumbency effect on the probability of winning the electoral 
competition at time t. The same results hold true also when we control for municipalities’ 
characteristics (column 3) and for the number of candidates running for a mayor position (column 4). 
As far as our control variables (municipal and candidates’ characteristics) are concerned, we find 
the expected results. Most of candidates’ characteristics matter. In fact, having one female candidate 
running for the mayor position negatively affects the probability of winning the electoral competition, 
highlighting a sort of discrimination toward women since electors prefer male candidates compared to 
females. Further, having elderly candidates negatively affects our dependent variable, maybe because 
electors like more younger candidates. Conversely, having more educated candidates does not affect 
the probability of winning the electoral race.  
Moreover, we do not find any partisan incumbency effect on the probability of winning the 
electoral competition: at Italian mayoral elections it does not matter if parties competing at the 
electoral race are incumbent or not. Finally, an increase in the political competition, as measured by 
the number of candidates running for a mayor position, leads to a decrease in the probability of 
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winning the electoral race by 2.3 percentage points. On the other hand, most of the municipalities’ 
characteristics do not produce any statistically significant impact on our outcome variable.  
 
Table 3: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) 
     
Personal Incumbency 0.362*** 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.343*** 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Partisan Incumbency  0.029 0.029 0.030 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Partisan Swing  0.022 0.022 0.022 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Candidates’ Age  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Candidates’ Education  0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female Candidates  -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Turnout   -0.488*** -0.430*** 
   (0.102) (0.099) 
Education Population   -0.025 -0.023 
   (0.018) (0.018) 
Employment   -0.025 -0.032 
   (0.096) (0.095) 
Elderly People   -0.362 -0.397 
   (0.285) (0.281) 
Population Size/1,000   0.002 0.004 
   (0.033) (0.033) 
Population Size^2   -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
No. Candidates    -0.023*** 
    (0.005) 
Constant 0.336*** 0.494*** 1.127*** 1.142*** 
 (0.023) (0.061) (0.231) (0.228) 
Bandwidth ±25% ±25% ±25% ±25% 
Electoral Margin Polynomial Third Third Third Third 
Observations 9,948 9,948 9,948 9,948 
R-squared 0.258 0.264 0.264 0.265 
Number of Municipalities 4,246 4,246 4,246 4,246 
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of winning the election at time t. We control for municipalities fixed effects and for 
electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions. We focus on municipalities with a population size lower than 15,000 
inhabitants and on elections characterized by a slack term limit for the mayor. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
All in all, the personal incumbency effect is always positive, statistically significant at 1 percent 
level and stable across specifications displayed in Table 3. This reassures us that adding further 
control variables does not dramatically affect the impact of our variable of interest on the probability 
of winning the competition at time t. In other words, results confirm the random assignment of the 
incumbency status around the threshold of margin of victory of zero (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008)
22
. 
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 In Table 4 we replicate estimations presented in the previous table for municipalities located in the 
Center-South and in the North of Italy in order to take into account the fact that the incumbency 
advantage may be dissimilar in different parts of Italy. In particular, Italy is very heterogeneous in 
terms of economic and social condition, with the northern part being richer and endowed with higher 
social capital compared to the South. In columns (1) and (2) we run a regression for municipalities 
located in the South, whereas in columns (3) and (4) we focus on northern municipalities.  
 
Table 4: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage South vs North 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 South South North North 
VARIABLES Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) 
     
Personal Incumbency 0.289*** 0.267*** 0.434*** 0.425*** 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.042) (0.046) 
Partisan Incumbency  0.036  0.013 
  (0.033)  (0.029) 
Partisan Swing  0.005  0.028 
  (0.028)  (0.023) 
Candidates’ Age  -0.002*  -0.005*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Candidates’ Education  0.002  0.004 
  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Female Candidates  -0.121***  -0.113*** 
  (0.046)  (0.033) 
Turnout  -0.293**  -0.556*** 
  (0.139)  (0.166) 
Education Population  -0.019  -0.014 
  (0.026)  (0.032) 
Employment  -0.029  -0.044 
  (0.176)  (0.121) 
Elderly People  0.073  -0.583 
  (0.413)  (0.413) 
Population Size/1,000  0.011  0.001 
  (0.048)  (0.045) 
Population Size^2  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
No. Candidates  -0.032***  -0.015** 
  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Constant 0.354*** 0.873*** 0.313*** 1.197*** 
 (0.031) (0.335) (0.036) (0.361) 
Bandwidth ±25% ±25% ±25% ±25% 
Electoral Margin Polynomial Third Third Third Third 
Observations 4,584 4,584 5,364 5,364 
R-squared 0.206 0.210 0.311 0.320 
Number of Municipalities 1,864 1,864 2,382 2,382 
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of winning the election at time t. We control for municipalities fixed effects 
and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
As highlighted in Table 4 in both areas the incumbent has a personal advantage in terms of 
winning the election at time t: the coefficient on our variable of interest is always statistically 
significant at 1 percent level and stable across the specifications, since it is not affected by the 
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inclusion of the control variables, such as municipalities, candidates and electoral competition’ 
characteristics. 
 However, the personal incumbency effect on the outcome variable is larger in terms of magnitude 
for northern municipalities compared to those located in the South. In particular, bare winners are 
42.5 percentage points more likely to win the competition compared to bare losers in the North. On 
the other hand, for southern municipalities the incumbent advantage seems to be 26.7 percentage 
points. 
All in all our results suggest that the personal incumbency advantage is stronger in developed 
areas, such as the North, compared to the South of Italy. This might be the case when population 
plagued with high levels of poverty, deficient public services, and with its basic necessities unsatisfied 
lives in an area of “endemic discontent” (Molina, 2001). As a consequence, it is difficult for the 
incumbent in the southern municipalities to satisfy the majority of voters and in turn, it is quite normal 
to expect that candidates in power will suffer a loss in terms of winning the electoral competition 
compared to candidates holding power in the North. Similar results are found by Molina (2001) for 
many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Further, we cannot exclude other channels, such as 
the electors' desire to punish incumbent politicians, who may have poorly performed in less developed 
areas, and to vote in favor of a new candidate. In fact, in both cases we would expect a smaller 
incumbency advantage in areas endowed with lower social capital such as the South of Italy.  
RDD results are also shown in Figure 3 (Panel a, b and c). In particular, we plot the estimated 
probability of winning the electoral competition at time t against the margin of victory at time t-1, 
close to the zero threshold, with a bandwidth of 25 percent above and below the cutoff. In Panel (a) 
we focus on elections in which an incumbent reruns for election in municipalities with a population 
size lower than 15,000, whereas in Panel (b) and (c) we show the incumbency advantage for southern 
and northern municipalities respectively again for elections held with single ballot and plurality rule.  
The circles represent the raw probability of winning, while the connected points are the predicted 
values from a linear probability model of an indicator variable for victory at time t on the incumbency 
dummy, a third-order polynomial in the margin of victory, and the provincial-time fixed effects. As 
shown in Panel (a), there is a sharp discontinuous jump right at the zero cutoff. Barely winners are 
much more likely to succeed in the next election, compared to bare losers. The same findings are 
highlighted in Panel (b) and (c), although the effect of the incumbency on the probability of winning 
the electoral competition is larger in northern municipalities compared to southern municipalities. 
Overall, graphs confirm results displayed in Table 3 and 4. 
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                                                     Figure 3: RDD Estimates – Incumbency Advantage 
 
 
5 Robustness Checks 
In this section we check the robustness of our results. Firstly, we consider only data in narrow 
neighborhoods around the discontinuity point (Local Linear Regression). Secondly, by choosing a 
large bandwidth around the zero margin of victory threshold, we include interaction terms between 
                       and different polynomials of the margin of victory in our regression.  
In particular, s a first robustness check, we re-estimate our original model by narrowing the sample 
close to the treatment threshold and choosing a bandwidth of 5 and 2 percent respectively above and 
below the cutoff of margin of victory of zero. Table 5 reports the Sharp RDD results for the 
discontinuity samples.  
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Table 5: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage – Discontinuity Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     South North 
VARIABLES Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) 
       
Personal Incumbency 0.434*** 0.394*** 0.453*** 0.338*** 0.270** 0.533*** 
 (0.068) (0.078) (0.113) (0.127) (0.115) (0.106) 
       
Controls No All No All All All 
Bandwidth ±5% ±5% ±2% ±2% ±5% ±5% 
Electoral Margin Polynomial Third Third Third Third Third Third 
Observations 2,677 2,677 1,116 1,116 1,300 1,377 
R-squared 0.149 0.157 0.158 0.188 0.113 0.224 
Number of Municipalities 1,360 1,360 589 589 637 723 
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of winning the election at time t. We control for municipalities fixed effects 
and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions. We focus on municipalities with a population size lower 
than 15,000 inhabitants and on elections characterized by a slack term limit for the mayor. Standard errors (corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that 
coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, in which we control for a third-order polynomial of the forcing 
variable, we focus on elections held with single ballot and plurality rule and we choose a bandwidth 
of 5 percent above and below the electoral margin threshold. We find that the personal incumbency 
effect on the probability of winning the electoral competition is positive and statistically significant at 
1 percent level. Similar results are obtained in columns (3) and (4), where the window has been 
narrowed at 2 percent above and below the cutoff. All in all, the incumbency effect tends to be stable 
across the specifications. Moreover, in the last two columns we present results for southern 
municipalities (column 5) and northern municipalities (column 6). Again we find that in both areas 
bare winners have a personal advantage in winning the competition compared to bare losers, although 
the effect of our variable of interest is larger in the North. 
As a second robustness check, we add interaction terms between our variable of interest and 
different polynomial functions of the assignment variable, i.e. the electoral margin, to check whether 
our model is well-specified, and whether the coefficient of                        is stable in 
terms of sign and magnitude independently from the specification used. Further, we choose a 
bandwidth of 25 percent above and below the zero margin of victory threshold and we control for a 
third-order polynomial of the margin of victory and for municipal-time fixed effects in all the 
specifications. Table 6 shows the main results.  
All in all, the coefficient on the personal incumbency status is always positive, statistically 
significant at 1 percent level and stable across the specifications
23
. Further, the magnitude of the effect 
is very similar to that found in Table 3 (column 4) and Table 4 (column 2 and 4) where we applied a 
Sharp RD design without interaction terms.  
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Table 6: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage – Interaction Terms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   South North 
VARIABLES Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) 
     
Personal Incumbency 0.353*** 0.330*** 0.214*** 0.442*** 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.072) (0.063) 
     
Controls No All All All 
Bandwidth ±25% ±25% ±25% ±25% 
Electoral Margin Polynomial Third Third Third Third 
Interaction Terms Third Third Third Third 
Observations 9,948 9,948 4,584 5,364 
R-squared 0.258 0.265 0.211 0.320 
Number of Municipalities 4,246 4,246 1,864 2,382 
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of winning the election at time t. We control for municipalities fixed effects 
and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions. We focus on municipalities with a population size lower 
than 15,000 inhabitants and on elections characterized by a slack term limit for the mayor. Standard errors (corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that 
coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
One of the greatest concerns in a democracy is that elected officials might become entrenched or that 
running for office simply becomes too expensive for fresh-candidates. By the nature of the democratic 
system, being incumbent is intrinsically advantageous since he/she is given access to resources and 
decision processes that non-incumbent challengers do not have. If elected officials are able to use 
their political influence to remain in power, voters will have a limited influence on their policy 
decisions (Linden, 2004). 
The general results in the literature have shown, on the one hand, a personal incumbency 
advantage both at the state (Garand, 1991; King, 1990; Cox and Morgenstern, 1993) and federal level 
(Erikson, 1971; Alford and Hibbing, 1981; Alford and Brady, 1988; Gelman and King, 1990) in U.S. 
House elections, since the incumbent candidate has a higher likelihood of winning the elections 
compared to his/her challengers, and on the other hand, an incumbency disadvantage for some 
developing countries, such as India (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 2009), Latin America and Caribbean 
countries (Molina, 2001). 
In this paper we have investigated the personal incumbency effect on the probability of 
winning the electoral competition at municipal level in Italy over the period 1993-2011. We 
have implemented a regression discontinuity design (RDD) and focused on very close elections which 
are decided by a narrow margin of victory, where the bare winners and bare losers of these elections 
are assumed to be comparable in their unobservable characteristics. In this way, by following Lee 
(2008), we have identified the causal effect of the incumbency status on our outcome variable. 
Our findings highlight a personal incumbency advantage since incumbents are 34.3 percentage 
points more likely to win the competition compared to their challengers. Moreover, results hold true 
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also when we control both for candidates and municipalities’ characteristics as well as for partisan 
swing and partisan incumbency effect. Further, we also find similar results when we consider only 
data in narrow neighborhoods around the discontinuity point (Local Linear Regression) and when we 
include interaction terms between the treatment variable and different polynomials of the forcing 
variable, i.e. the margin of victory at time t-1. 
Finally, we have analyzed the personal incumbency effect separately for municipalities located in 
the Center-South and in the North of Italy in order to take into account the fact that the incumbency 
advantage may be dissimilar in different parts of Italy, since the northern part is richer and endowed 
with higher social capital compared to the South. We have found that in both areas the incumbent 
has a personal advantage in terms of winning the election at time t, although the effect of interest is 
larger in magnitude for northern municipalities compared to southern municipalities. One potential 
explanation is that when population plagued with high levels of poverty, deficient public services, and 
with its basic necessities unsatisfied lives in an area of “endemic discontent” (Molina, 2001), it will be 
hard for the incumbent in the southern municipalities to satisfy the majority of voters and as a 
consequence, candidates in power will suffer a loss in terms of winning the electoral competition 
compared to candidates holding power in the North. 
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